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PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press. 1975. Pp. v + 135.
Michael A. Murray*
Justice Holmes once noted that the law sharpens the mind by narrowing
it. Perspectives on Justice, a little volume about the law and for lawyers
proves the point. By and large this work is a rather narrow view of a
large social issue. Unfortunately two-thirds of the volume is also some-
what dull when it could have been provocative.
Perhaps this judgment is pre-determined by the nature of the docu-
ment. Perspectives on Justice, published in 1975 by the Northwestern
University Press, is a collection of speeches presented in the Julius Rosen-
thal Foundation lectures for 1973. Given the two to three year gap be-
tween the speech and the publication date, the content was bound to lose
some of its punch. This usually happens when speeches are printed later.
By its nature a speech must be timely; thus its content is geared to the
immediate interests of a specific audience. When the speech is published
two or three years later, the immediate issue changes and audience inter-
est changes. In short, something is lost in the transition.
There is another problem, perhaps generic to publishing collections of
speeches. This is the lack of a common theme. Good speakers, in order
to give a sharp, memorable talk, project their own ideas. Unlike an edited
book, which derives from a common theme, a series of lectures is based
on individual points of view. While this may be good for the speech, it
is awkward when the speeches appear together in print.
Datedness and disassociation are two serious flaws affecting this
published volume. There are other comments to be made-some positive,
most critical.
The first chapter (and lecture) in the book is "The Concept of Justice
and the Laws of War" by Telford Taylor, who brings a remarkable array
of credentials to the subject. Professor Taylor asks the abstract and im-
portant question: are the laws of war compatible with the concept of jus-
tice? Or to put the question another way: does justice wither when war
erupts?
* Associate Professor, Public Management Program, Graduate School of Man-
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To appreciate Taylor's rather abstract answer to this weighty question,
it is probably helpful to take oneself back in time to 1972 and the swirl-
ing controversy over Cambodia, Mai Lai, and Lieutenant Calley. This
helps to understand the context of the speech but it does little to make
Taylor's discourse less abstract.
In essence, Professor Taylor refutes John Rawls' notion of what I will
call situational justice. Instead he argues the case for abstract justice: the
principle that there are immutable laws of justice between nations which
govern the conduct of all wars anywhere. This is simplifying the idea,
but this, I gather, is his basic point. The problem I have with Taylor's
thesis, given the advantage of hindsight and the recognized failure of our
involvement in Vietnam, is that Western concepts of justice simply do not
apply everywhere in the world. Indeed it seems only our imperialistic pat-
tern to assume that they do.
Professor Taylor argues as a reasonable, rational, Western man, who
speaks from a vast knowledge of experience and codified law as it
developed in Western society. Nevertheless, for him to assume, even in
the abstract, that legal concepts such as justice apply to other countries is
to miss the lesson of what is happening in countries abroad. Our models
often do not apply. Likewise our concepts of legal or illegal wars do not
apply. Consequently it is misleading to argue, as Professor Taylor does,
that justice, in order to apply to the conduct of wars, needs only a juris-
dictional mechanism. There is more to it than that. There are vast so-
cial, political, and cultural differences between countries and between their
concepts of war and the legality of war. In Cambodia it is "honorable"
for soldiers to eat the hearts and organs of their dead enemies. Is this
just or injust? By whose standards? Professor Taylor, operating in the
abstract, uses only Western measures and scales of justice. His talk pro-
vides a good survey of the narrow legal principles affecting the question.
Unfortunately he did not, in 1973, consider wider social and cultural con-
siderations.
The second chapter is by Constance Baker Motley, a U.S. District
Judge, and is titled, "Criminal Law: 'Law and Order' and the Criminal
Justice System." Her main thesis is that there is a need to reform the
sentencing process. Or to put it another way: there is no "law and order"
in the present sentencing process.
The main reason Judge Motley sees sentencing as a central problem is
that presently there are no clear guidelines for the criminal justice process.
Consequently, much discretion is given to certain key individuals: arrest-
ing officers who decide to arrest or not; prosecutors who determine degree
and intensity of prosecution; judges who decide bail and sentencing; juries
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which can acquit or convict; wardens and prison guards who can invoke
a variety of disciplinary sanctions; and parole boards which can hear or
not hear cases. In short: "Our criminal justice system, from beginning
to end, lacks 'law and order' to a substantial degree" (p. 41).
Judge Motley favors, as a solution, specific guidelines for judges and
juries regarding sentencing and perhaps more importantly, legislated man-
da-tory penalties that are graduated, relatively short, and which give every
first offender probation. As a result of the kind of mandatory practices
which she advocates, Judge Motley argues that sentencing would become
impartial in the following ways:
1. The sentence would depend on the crime, not on the status of the
person charged, whether rich or poor, black or white, educated or unedu-
cated.
2. Parole boards would exist only to consider humanitarian requests,
not to shorten sentences, since there would be minimum mandatory sen-
tences.
3. Juries would be more willing to convict when the punishment fits the
crime; presently they acquit a guilty person when punishment is too harsh.
4. The police would be more willing to arrest for a crime committed
in their presence if sentences were not unduly harsh.
5. Lawless actions by prison officials would be eliminated.
6. Victimless crimes would be outside a criminal justice system and
guilty persons would be placed (by the legal system?) in treatment cen-
ters.
It is easy to see where mandatory penalties, both graduated and short,
might provide clear guidelines for sentencing judges and for jury decisions.
It is less obvious how mandatory penalties would affect arresting officers
and prosecutors. It is common knowledge that the arresting process is
closely linked to bias and attitude, and that prosecutorial patterns are fre-
quently dependent on staff availability, docket backlog, and sometimes po-
litical considerations.
The biggest issue, however, is how mandatory penalties would prevent
wardens and prison-guards from lawless activities. Removing discretion
from sentencing will not itself prevent arbitrary use of sanctions in prison.
The non-imprisoned public stays far away from the scene and prisons usu-
ally are built far from population centers. Relatives of prisoners see them
infrequently and only through a screen. When prisoner complaints are
voiced they are often used as proof that "these people" are liars, ingrates,
or worse. Watchdog committees do not see a normal day in prison; rather
they see a cleaned-up version of what occurs. Physical and verbal abuse
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will not stop with the introduction of mandatory penalties: it will stop only
when there is a prisoner advocate system which includes prisoners and has
sufficient "clout" to enforce institutional change.
What does all of this have to do with Motley's procedural proposals?
The point is that if prisons themselves are part of the unjust system, why
offer procedural reforms which only marginally change these institutional-
ized patterns of abuse? This is one way of noting that Judge Motley's
procedural reforms, in effect, are designed to serve the interests of the
legal profession, i.e., judges, juries, lawyers, officers, and wardens. They
do little to enhance the lives of those who suffer most from the lawlessness
of the system. For example, Judge Motley says that victimless crimes,
under her reform, would be removed from mandatory judicial penalties
and would be placed within a "treatment system." This of course is a
continuing problem in the legal. system: dumping people in mental hospi-
tals and in alcoholic treatment centers when, the law is uncomfortable with
them. If the legal system does not want to deal with alcoholism, drug
abuse, prostitution, and other victimless crimes, then it should stop label-
ing these activities as criminal.
Two serious criticisms of her proposals emerge. First, the mandatory
penalties process is a way of alleviating some of the problems of discretion
within the legal community, but it does little to soften the most painful
blows of discretionary punishment now borne by the non-legal community.
Second, the reform seeks procedural change and does little to question the
purposes and consequences of the correctional system, particularly prisons.
In summary, the reform offered represents a rather narrow legal point of
view.
If the first lecture was culture-bound, the second was profession-bound.
Fortunately the third lecture overcame these limiting factors. Professor
James K. Feibleman gets to the heart of the series and discusses, "Philo-
sophical Perspectives on Justice." Professor Feibleman is not a lawyer,
but I found his remarks' perceptive and provocative. Perhaps it is my bias
that "law is too important to be left to the lawyers," which colors this cri-
tique.
In searching for the theory of justice and the definition of justice, Fei-
bleman recognizes the essential fact *that' definitions and theories vary ac-
cording to situations and conditions. Justice, in a word, is indeterminite;
this is not to say the concept is useless.
On the contrary, justice, as defined by Professor Feibleman, is "the de-
mand for order: everything in its proper place or relation" (p. 98). He
continues by noting that justice obviously requires a system of administra-
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tion to put and keep things in place. Thus, justice becomes the demand
for a system of laws. He considers the concept of justice from many
points of view: the legal, the moral, the philosophical, and the historical.
His expertise in these areas is impressive and he gives us a lively and
interesting survey of the concepts involved. While some of his ideas are
undoubtedly abstract, the chapter as a whole is readable and interesting.
It is easy after reading Professor Feibleman to sense the importance
which this series of lectures, and ultimately this edition, represents. Per-
haps, if I had read the chapters in reverse order it would have put things
in perspective. As it is, my "perspective on justice" was limited to a very
legalistic discourse on international law, a procedural blueprint for court
reform, and finally a philosophical treatise on concepts of justice. These
general criticisms and comments should not disuade the reader from select-
ing one or another of the chapters. Individually and in the context of
its time, each chapter is a useful contribution. However, presented in
1975 as a composite Perspective on Justice, these three dissociated view-
points do not hold together.
